Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
Anthropology Department Scholars Week

Anthropology

Spring 2020

The Eastern European Fertility Crisis
Sebastian Dominic Zgirski
Western Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/anthropology_scholarsweek
Part of the Anthropology Commons

Recommended Citation
Zgirski, Sebastian Dominic, "The Eastern European Fertility Crisis" (2020). Anthropology Department
Scholars Week. 3.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/anthropology_scholarsweek/3

This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology at Western CEDAR. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Department Scholars Week by an authorized administrator of Western
CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

The Eastern European Fertility Crisis
Sebastian D. Zgirski

Kathleen Saunders
ANTH 490, Spring 2019
August 8th, 2019

Zgirski 1
Introduction
In 1989 Poland, Hungary and East Germany abandoned communism and broke free
of the Iron curtain. Then, on December 26th of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
officially dissolved ending nearly 70 years of communism in Europe. Following these events
a rapid large scale social, political and economic transition took place. Many of these
countries adopted new constitutions and became democracies, closely aligning themselves to
Western Europe and the United States. However, with these profound political, social, and
economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe, scholars observed another trend: increasingly
lower fertility rates.
In the years following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (the defense treaty that
united the USSR with the rest of the Eastern Bloc), it became evident that the fertility rates in
the former Warsaw Pact countries were declining. However, not only were the fertility rates
in these countries declining; they were declining to some of the lowest levels in the world. In
her article “The Post-Communist Fertility Puzzle”, social demographer Sunnee Billingsley
states “As of 2004, 15 countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) have entered lowest-low fertility (fertility rates at 1.3 or under) at least once”
(Billingsley 2009, 194). Additionally, many Eastern European countries continue to have
some of the lowest birth rates in the world, with eight former Warsaw Pact members being
found in the bottom 20 countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world, the largest
proportion of countries to share a geographic region in the bottom 20 (Central Intelligence
Agency n.d). Interestingly, this drop in fertility has coincided with the various social and
economic changes that have swept across region since the fall of communism, asking the
questions of could the phenomena be related?
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Author Background
Social and political issues taking place within Eastern Europe, and, notably, Poland,
are of great interest to the author. The author is the child of Polish immigrants living in the
United States, and also has several family members currently living in Poland. Additionally,
the author himself identifies as both a Pole and an American, holding citizenships to both
countries. Culturally, the author is closely connected to his family’s homeland as he speaks
Polish fluently and has visited Poland several times.
Structure of the Paper
In this paper I will examine the decline in fertility in the post-communist countries of
Europe. For the most part, I will be using the blanket term of “Eastern Europe” to refer to
these countries, as that is the official term the United Nations uses. Although, at times, I will
also use the term Central Europe to refer to Eastern European countries that are
geographically closer to Western Europe.
In order to conduct my analysis I have gathered data in regards to fertility in Eastern
Europe from before and after the 1989 revolutions. Amongst this data I have gathered actual
fertility rates, which are measured using the standard Total Fertility rate (TFR) defined by the
World Health Organization as the ”total number of children born or likely to be born to a
woman in her life time if she were subject to the prevailing rate of age-specific fertility in the
population” (The World Health Organization n.d). To supplement my data on fertility rates, I
have also a looked at factors such as GDP, democratic stability, and death rates. Furthermore,
I have examined the social changes in Eastern Europe in a more qualitative manner through
examining news articles and videos, documentaries, and other forms of media. Finally, I have
looked at some of the arguments put forth by other scholars in regards to why this drop in
fertility has taken place.
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However, there are some important limitations to take into consideration in
examining the data. Mainly, there has not been a lot of research done on Warsaw Pact
demographics that is not tied to Soviet propaganda pre-1989 (Wertherell and Plakans 1997,
245). It is a similar situation for data on pre-1989 GDP’s as well, as the Soviet Union would
record its GDP data inaccurately (Balcerowicz 2002, 36). As a result, the pre-1989
demographic and economic statistics that will be provided in this paper may be skewed.
In regards to how I have conducted my research, there are also limitations that must
be taken into consideration. Notably, the purpose of this paper is to provide a general
overview of the fertility decline in Eastern Europe. Thus, my research is not all
encompassing, and I will not be focusing on every country that is considered to be in the
region. Additionally, many of the conclusions that I will be coming to will be generalizations
based on observed trends throughout the region. In regards to this I would like to highlight
that Eastern Europe is a large and culturally diverse area, and that the social, economic, and
cultural circumstances do differ significantly from country to country.
In terms of how my analysis will be presented, I have divided this paper into multiple
sections. In the first section, I will take a closer look at the actual rates of fertility in Eastern
Europe. In the second section, I will briefly explain the negative effects of the population
decline in Eastern Europe. In the third section, I will discuss relevant history and background
information. After explaining the background information, I will then review existing
literature on the fertility crisis in Eastern Europe in the fourth section. Mainly, this literature
will focus on explaining the phenomenon. In the penultimate section I will examine the
changes that have occurred throughout the region from a more qualitative approach. Finally,
in the sixth section I will discuss my findings. I ultimately, aim to conclude that the various
social and economic changes in Eastern Europe have impacted the fertility rates in the region.
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The Numbers
In recent years, as Eastern Europe has underwent it’s fertility transformation, various
demographic organizations have been documenting Eastern Europe’s fertility trends.
According to the United Nations World Fertility Patters report, the global total fertility rate is
2.5 children per woman, with Europe having the lowest levels of total fertility in the world at
1.6 (United Nations 2015, 3). In contrast, Africa, the continent with the world’s highest total
fertility rate has a TFR of 4.7 children per woman (United Nations 2015, 3). Thus, the issue
of low fertility rates seems to be one occurring in all of Europe. However in regards to
Eastern Europe the United Nations reports that the fertility rates in Eastern Europe are some
of the lowest in Europe (United Nations 2015, 3). The United Nations does report projected
growth in Eastern Europe from a TFR of 1.6 to a TFR of 1.7 by 2030, however even this still
puts Eastern Europe as the region with the second lowest TFR in Europe after Southern
Europe (United Nations 2015, 22-24). While on the rise, it is important to consider that there
was still a significant drop in fertility from about 2.1 between 1970- 1975 to about 1.6 from
1990-1995 (United Nations 2015, 23). Additionally, even with the increase, a fertility rate of
1.7 is still the below the replacement rate which according to the United Nations is at about
2.1 children per women (United Nations 2017). Thus, even with a projected rise in fertility
rates, the rates of birth in many Eastern European countries are still below replacement level.
When examining these fertility rates more closely and by country, the numbers
become even more severe. For instance according to The World Bank , in the year 2017 the
total fertility rate was 1.2 for Moldova , 1.37 for the Ukraine, 1.38 for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1.39 for Poland, 1.48 for Slovakia, 1.53 for Hungary, 1.54 for Bulgaria,
Belarus, and North Macedonia, 1.58 for Slovenia, 1.6 for Estonia, 1.63 for the Czech
Republic, 1.64 for Romania, 1.69 for Lithuania, and 1.76 for Russia (The World Bank, 2019).
In comparison with the time period before the fall of communism many of these numbers are

Zgirski 5
drastically different. In 1980 the fertility rate was 2.48 in Moldova, 1.95 for the Ukraine, 2.1
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.28 for Poland, 2.32 for Slovakia, 1.91 for Hungary, 2.05 for
Bulgaria, 2.03 for Belarus, 2.49 for North Macedonia, 2.06 for Slovenia, 2.02 for Estonia,
2.08 for the Czech Republic, 2.43 for Romania, 1.99 for Lithuania, and 1.89 for Russia (The
World Bank, 2019). Through this country by country analysis of TFR rates, it is evident that
the decline of TFR rates in Eastern Europe is significate, and the actual scope of the TFR
drop becomes much clearer.
What Low Fertility Rates Mean for Eastern Europe
The issue of declining fertility rates in Eastern Europe asks the question of what does
this mean for Eastern European countries? In their paper Billari, Kohler and Ortega state that
“lowest-low” fertility rates can have a drastic impact on a population, pointing out that a
fertility rate of 1.3 will reduce a population in half every 45 years (Billari, Kohler and Ortega
2004, 642). As one can imagine, the halving of a population in such as way creates a variety
of social and economic issues within a country. In regards to Poland, a country with TFR of
about 1.39 (The World Bank, 2019), Nalaskowski discusses how a low fertility rate will
impact the population in regards to age. He brings up that with Poland’s dropping population
the age of the country’s workforce is expected to drop by over 3.8 million by 2035,
decreasing the number of people to take care of minors and the elderly by 18% and
increasing the number of retirees dependent on working people (Nalaskowski 2014, 49).
What this means for Poland is that there will be more citizens seeking retirement pensions
from the government, and fewer people to generate wealth within the economy to sustain
paying retirement pensions. The issue of aging populations is but one of the risks a country
can face in experiencing a lowest-low TFR, and it is an issue that is already beginning to
impact some Eastern European countries.
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Background in Post-Communism
After the Second World War, most countries in Eastern Europe fell into the Soviet
zone of influence. The Soviet Union worked to restructure the governments of these
countries, forming communist parties to run the countries, and restructuring the economies of
these countries (Bunce, 1985, 4-8). Resultantly, the divide between democratic Western
Europe and communist Eastern Europe came into existence. This divide was known as the
Iron Curtain, this name symbolizing the intensity of the Soviets desire to seal themselves and
Eastern Europe off from the democratic West (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018). Eventually as
a reaction to the creation of NATO these countries officially united their alliance in 1955 in
the creation of the Warsaw Pact, a political and military organization (Remington 1973, 61).
The official members of the pact were Poland, Romania, The Soviet Union, Albania,
Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (History.com, 2009). These Warsaw
Pact countries stayed under Soviet influence for many years, however there had long been
popular resistance among Warsaw Pact countries, such as with the Prague Spring in 1957 in
Czechoslovakia or the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement in Poland in the early 1980s
(Kramer 1989, 1535). Over the years these popular movements had their toll on the durability
of Iron Curtain and of communism in Eastern Europe.
In the 1980’s the Iron Curtain’s stability was further weakened after Mikhail
Gorbachev become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
1985. Gorbachev’s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe called for no military intervention
on the U.S.S.R’s part in the case of communism collapsing in other countries, and thus many
Eastern Europeans felt more empowered to fight for regime changes in their countries
(Kramer 1989, 1535, 1545-1515). Initially, Poland overthrew communism in a peaceful
revolution through its Solidarność movement in 1989. Shortly after Poland, the East Germans
were inspired to do the same, and after their peaceful revolution the Berlin Wall which had
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divided communist East Berlin from democratic West Belin fell. It was demolished in
November of 1989. Country after country, the anti-communist sentiment spread, leading to
peaceful anti-communist revolutions in all of Eastern Europe (except in Romania), until
finally the sentiment spread into the Soviet Union itself leading to its collapse in 1991 ( U.S.
Department of State n.d). Thus, communism in Eastern Europe was over and the region
found itself amid an economic, political, and social transition.
This transition phase is known as post-communism. More closely, post-communism
is defined as “the cultural or political situation following or resulting from a period of
communist government, now especially that of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early
1990s” (Oxford Dictionaries.com n.d). Once it began, post-communism had a profound effect
on the countries of Eastern Europe. Primarily, in post-communism one of the main goals of
many former Warsaw Pact countries was to develop Western style democracies in their
countries, with similar systems based on rule of law and checks and balances (Schopflin
1991, 236). Post-communism has, accordingly, been a period of great change and transition
for all Eastern Europe, as Eastern European counties have left communism and adopted
Western forms of government.
However, it is important to note that the political outcomes in these countries have
been different. For instance, while a majority of former communist Eastern European
countries have joined the European Union, there are still several countries that have not
joined, those countries being Albania, Belarus, most of former Yugoslavia (except for Croatia
and Slovenia), Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine (WorldAtlas.com, 2018).. Some of these
countries such as the Ukraine have been working more closely with the Union in recent
years, others such as Bosnia and Herzegovina have applied for membership to the Union
(WorldAtlas.com 2018). Russia, on the other hand, leads its own Political and Economic
alliance with its former Soviet Republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
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(CTGN 2017). The Economist’s World Democracy Index ratings of these countries also
significantly differ, with the EU countries generally falling within the 6.0-7.99 (flawed
democracy) range, the CIS countries falling within the 0.0-3.99 (authoritarian regime) range,
and the unaffiliated countries such as the Ukraine or Serbia falling within the 4.0-5.99
(hybrid regime) range. (The Economist 2019). Understandably, these political outcomes are
not the only ways in which former Iron Curtain states differ from each other today.
Economically and socially, there have been large discrepancies as well. According to
the 1999 report from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for instance,
mortality rates among males aged 40-59, which were relatively the same among all Eastern
European countries in 1989, have drastically fallen in Central Europe countries, and risen in
among the Baltic and CIS states (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999,
15) The same report also shows a significant increase in poverty among CIS states since
1989, and only a light to moderate increase in poverty for countries in Central Europe and the
Baltic States (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999, 16). Finally, the
report points out that since 1989 the real GDP rates of the Baltic States and Central Europe
initially fell, but recovered and are on the rise, while those of the CIS states have tanked and
plateaued at a level significantly lower than before (European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development 1999, 58). As can be seen from this data, while post-communism did create a
wave of sweeping changes throughout Eastern Europe, those changes have not been equal.
A Review of Literature
The alarmingly low rates of total fertility in Eastern Europe have prompted many
scholars to examine the issue closely, and many have developed theories and hypothesis in
order to explain the phenomenon. One popular theory that researches point to is the Second
Demographic Transition Theory, According to Lesthaeghe the Second Demographic
Transition or (SDT) has brought about developments form the 1970’s and onward that have
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led to sustained sub-replacement fertility levels in Western countries, living arrangements
other than marriage, disconnections between marriage and procreation, and a lack of a
stationary population (Lesthaeghe 2014,18112). As for the reasons behind SDT Lesthaeghe
discusses the importance of higher order needs, that is, an increase in education and growth
of income, more expressive and existential needs, self-actualization, and individual autonomy
(Lesthaeghe 2014, 18114). Thus, according to the SDT theory a change in values and a
cultural shift from a materialistic society to a post materialistic one leads to a decrease in
marriage, a lack of interest in procreation, and an increase in migration, all of which
negatively impact fertility.
Scholars have examined this the theory in order to explain the current demographic
crisis in Eastern Europe. For example in regards to Russia, Zakharov strongly argues for an
SDT as being the reason why fertility rates are declining in that country. To make his point
he examines marriage rates in Russia. He notes that Russians born in the 1970’s and onward
have received more post-Soviet socialization (Zakharov 2008, 932). He then notes that this
cohort has higher rates of older marriage, higher rates of non-marital cohabitation, and
higher rates of birth outside of marriage than before (Zakharov 2008, 934). He also points
out that the fertility of women under the age of 20 has almost halved in recent years
(Zakharov 2008, 936). Zakharov ultimately looks at the correlation between marriage and
fertility rates and argues that the changes in Russian marriage patterns are indicators of an
SDT occurring in Russia. Similar to Zakharov, Walford and Kurek also look at SDT
indicators such as lower TFR rates, an increase in extra-marital unions, and a higher child
bearing ages, but in Poland. They find that those phenomena are happening in Poland since
the 1990’s in ways that are relatively comparable to how they happened in England and
Wales, countries considered to have already undergone SDT’s (Walford and Kurek 2015,
512-514). Accordingly, Walford and Kurek, too claim that an SDT is occurring in Poland.
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On the other hand, another theory, referred to as the economic crisis theory, that has
been advanced by scholars examines the effects economics have on a population’s fertility
rate. Billingsley summarizes this theory, originally pioneered by Becker (1960). According to
Billingsley this theory claims that fertility is based upon the cost of children, which are
mediated by household income (Billingsley 2009, 197). In this theory, the direct and indirect
pros and cons of having children are weighed against the costs and the household income,
thus in a region with economic turbulence, such as Eastern Europe during the postcommunist transition, fertility would decline, as families decided that they cannot afford a
child.
In regards to this theory there have also been several scholars who have been
supportive of it. Corina and Paniccià (1996), for instance, argue that the cost of marriage and
creating a family is higher for those at younger ages in several Eastern European countries
and that economic difficulties have worsened these cost for younger couples, leading to
marriage at a later age. They also point to unemployment as a factor in the later age of
marriage and postponement of child bearing in these countries (Corina and Paniccià 1996,
14). They argue that this along with an increase of male migration and male mortality have
led to there being less women married while younger and more fertile, which they correlate
with lower TFR rates (Corina and Paniccià 1996, 15). They also point out that as a result of
the transition from communism the price of raising a child has skyrocketed, and that
government financial incentives to support fertility have been less effective due to this
increase (Corina and Paniccià 1996, 15). Corina and Paniccià thus conclude that the drop in
fertility rates in the countries they examined is an outcome of greater societal changes, which
stem from economic hardship.
An issue that has been pointed out about the economic crisis theory, however is that it
examines the relationship of fertility and economics from a macro scale. For example, in their
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analysis of fertility patterns and economic uncertainty in Russia during the 1990’s, Kohler
and Kohler come to conclusions that contradict the economic theory. Initially they note that
in a macro analysis of fertility rates and economic disparity, the two are related with a strong
correlation existing between the fall of the Gross National Product of Russia in the 1990’s
and Russia’s TFR drop during that period (Kohler and Kohler 2002, 237-239). However,
while their initial findings seem to support the economic crisis theory, Kohler and Kohler
point out that from a micro analysis the situation is different. Their micro analysis findings
show that childbirth is actually positively correlated with male unemployment, male unpaid
wages, and female unpaid wages (Kohler and Kohler 2002, 246-249). These findings show
that while the economic crisis theory may be effective in conducting a macro analysis of
fertility declines, it might not always work in regards to analyzing fertility declines among
individuals.
Other scholars have taken a look at both the SDT theory and economic theory in order
to come to their conclusions. Sunnee Billingsley argues that the decline in birth rates across
Eastern Europe can be related to an SDT, or the economic crisis theory. She notes, however,
that the applicability of these theories varies by different groups of countries. She found that
most countries experienced postponement after the transition and that in many countries the
postponement was positively tied to economic growth. In her findings, the countries that
experienced stopping of births in lieu of postponement, or significantly less postponement,
experienced more economic struggle after the transition from communism (Billingsley 2009,
202-211, 220). Billingsley’s research seems to support either an SDT in countries where
postponement was correlated with economic growth and stopping of births in counties that
were economically damaged, supporting the SDT theory and Becker’s (1960) economic
analysis of fertility.
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Other scholars have reached similar conclusions to Billingsley. For instance Philipov
and Kohler conclude in their paper that the quantum of fertility (the number of children born
to a women during her lifetime) has decreased in both Russia and Bulgaria, while that has not
been the case in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, which have been more
economically well off than the former. Those countries rather experienced tempo effects (a
change in the timing of when a women choses to have a child) (Philipov and Kohler 2001,
55). Similarly, Sobotka, also states that the positive economic changes in the economically
more successful Eastern European countries effected what fertility looked like in those
countries, leading to a postponement in childbirth, while lower economic conditions in
countries such as Russia led to people having less children and at younger age (Sobotka
2003, 476-477). Like Billingsley, several other scholars agree that an SDT encouraged
postponement occurred in Eastern Europe in countries that were socially and economically
better off, while a stopping occurred in countries that struggled as a result of the transition. It,
thus, seems that this approach is gaining popularity and traction in academic circles.
Besides the SDT theory or the economic crisis theory, scholars have advocated for
other explanations of the TFR changes in Eastern Europe. Like the SDT theory, Thornton and
Philipov make an ideological argument, however the way in which they view this ideological
shift differs from a traditional SDT approach. In their research Thornton and Philipov claim
that Eastern Europeans had observed the increasing tolerance of pre-marital sex, abortions,
cohabitation, and same sex marriage in Western European Countries during the late 20th
century (Thornton and Philipov 2007, 51). They also argue that after the fall of communism,
Eastern Europeans turned their attention to Western European countries which they saw as
more modern, successful, and developed (Thornton and Philipov 2007, 28). Accordingly, the
increasingly lower birth rates in Eastern Europe stem from an ideological shift. However
unlike traditional SDT arguments, according to this argument the shift results from Eastern
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Europeans adopting Western European values which they saw as conducive to success and
modernity; there is less of a focus on self-actualization.
Another contribution to the debate points to capitalism itself as the catalyst for the
TFR trends in Eastern Europe. In his paper Frejka states that the change from a planned
socialist economy to a free market one is the root cause of the fertility decline in Eastern
Europe (Frejka 2008, 160). He claims that the social conditions in communist Eastern Europe
were favorable to childbearing due to conditions such as free housing, free education, and a
lack of career opportunities. He then points out that the transition to a capitalist system raised
the costs of goods, increased competition among workers, created new career opportunities,
put pressure to pursue higher education, and decreased state welfare, resulting in conditions
that negatively impact fertility (Frejka 2008, 161). Frejka’s argument examines the social and
economic conditions in Eastern Europe. His examples do not necessarily contradict an SDT
or an economic crisis, but rather tend to show that an SDT or economic crisis stem from
transition to capitalism. Ultimately he claims that the transition to capitalism itself is the
culprit behind Eastern Europe’s decline in fertility.
Finally, a recent theory used to explain declining birth rates in Europe focuses on the
postponement of birth to a later age. In their research, Billari, Kohler and Ortega highlight
that in recent years in Southern, Eastern and Central Europe the mean age of a women’s first
birth has been increasing annually (Billari, Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 644). This results in the
fertility rates of these countries being lowered. Billari, Kohler and Ortega also point out that
this postponement likely stems from a lack of employment opportunities, and that people are
choosing to delay having children to an older age to find work or obtain an education (Billari,
Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 655-656). This ties the theory very closely with the economic crisis
theory proposed earlier, however there is also more to this theory than the economic aspect.
Billari, Kohler and Ortega further point out that this postponement creates a social feedback
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loop. That is, people look to others to see when they had children, social norms are created in
regards to when to have children, people choose to get married later for economic stability
and better quality partners, and childlessness begins to make people more competitive in the
employment marketplace (Billari, Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 657-659). In summary,
according to this theory postponement occurs as a result of socioeconomic factors that lead
people to choose to have children later when they are more financially stable. This creates a
social feedback loop in which society encourages postponement, lowering the countries
fertility rate over time.
From examining the literature surrounding the fertility decline in post-communist
Eastern Europe , it is clear that the Second Demographic Transition Theory and Becker’s
(1960) theory of economics and fertility are some of the most common explanations for the
decline. Some scholars have examined the Eastern European region using only one of the
aforementioned theories, while others have chosen to examine countries separately to find
which explanation fits best with a given country. However, there is another group of scholars
that have used explanations other than an SDT or economic crisis. For example these
scholars have attributed the TFR decrease in Eastern Europe to the region comparing itself to
the West, transitioning to capitalism, and people postponing childbearing to wait for better
financial stability. Yet this third group of scholars still focuses on new cultural, and economic
influences, such as proponents of an SDT or economic crisis. All in all, while there are many
different explanations on the specific reasons behind the fertility decline in Eastern Europe,
there is consensus that the TFR declines are related to cultural and economic changes.
Changes: The People’s Point of View
In the years since the transition, the various changes in the societies of Eastern Europe
have been massive, especially from the people’s point of view. In my own experience as a child
of Polish immigrants, I have heard my parents talk about these changes when my family would

Zgirski 15
visit Poland during my childhood. My mother, for example, to this day consistently brings up
supermarkets, and how they have revolutionized grocery shopping in Poland. My mother
always says that during her childhood the stores were small, clerks would fetch items for people
to buy from usually empty shelves, and the lines were huge. People were also given food ration
cards, and people could only buy food allocated to them through those cards. Today, my mother
says, thanks to supermarkets, getting a healthy amount of food is actually possible in Poland,
and it is quick, convenient, and easy. Not only that, but my mother also says that the
introduction of supermarkets in Poland makes the country feel more modern, and more
Western, something which she appreciates. This introduction of supermarkets has also
happened everywhere in Central Europe and even in countries like Russia (Machek 2012;
Tracey and Wilson 2019). The introduction of supermarkets may not seem important, however,
it is an indicator of the economic, social, and cultural changes that have happened in Eastern
Europe since the transition.
In general this transition has also created significant cultural changes within Eastern
European countries. For instance there is a growing sense of freedom, self-autonomy, and carefreeness found in the cultures of the region. Euronews shows an example of this in a short video
clip. In the clip, they interview a 27 year old Polish man who gives historic tours of Warsaw.
In regards to Poland’s new sense of freedom he says “My generation, is the first generation for
the last 200 years that didn’t fight for anything” (Euronews 2014, 00:07:08). In a different part
of the video clip a tailor, Tomasz Clapala, notes that he feels free and happy in regards to how
easily he can now travel with his Polish passport (Euronews 2014, 00:03:04). In Hungary this
sense of freedom can be observed through simply walking the streets of a larger city such as
Budapest. In the “Budapest” episode of Rick Steves’ Europe, Rick Steves’ points out that
Budapest has only grown more lively since the fall of communism, with the camera panning
to show a shot of people sitting in cafés, sipping beer, eating dinners at restaurants and enjoying
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life in a care-free manner (Rick Steves’ Europe 2004, 00:24:35). The people of both Poland
and Hungary feel a sense of freedom in their countries that hasn’t been felt in generations, and
they are grateful for it.
Now, it is an established fact that the changes in Eastern Europe have been unequal,
and rather negative for some, however these cultural feelings freedom, autonomy, and worryfreeness are even felt in the Eastern European countries that are typically considered “less
developed”. For example in the Ukraine, these changes can be seen through the fact that in
2019 the Ukraine hosted it’s largest ever and least violent Pride parade in Kiev. The event had
thousands of marchers for LGBTQ equality, and only a handful of counter-equality protestors
(Schaaf 2019). In Russia this new sense of freedom can be observed through experiencing the
hustle and bustle of Moscow, which the BBC presents in their documentary series World’s
Busiest Cities. In the episode “Moscow” (2017), journalist Anita Rani discusses the new sense
of freedom and westernization that Muscovites feel as the city is modernizing, while visiting
Krymskaya Embarkment, a new park built in downtown Moscow from a carpark. As the
camera pans to show people enjoying the park she says “loads of people just hanging out,
enjoying each other’s company, dudes on skateboards. We might take this for granted back
home, but it’s a really new thing for Moscow” (BBC 2017, 00:48:50). In spite of the highly
unequal impacts of post communism, a significant cultural change has occurred across Eastern
Europe, in which people feel freer.
Nonetheless, while Eastern Europe has experienced this cultural change and new sense
of freedom, there are still many countries in the region where people have been negatively
impacted by the transition, and this is an important factor to consider. For example, today many
Romanians are forced to work in textile factories for low wages and in abhorrent conditions,
essentially working in sweat shops This can be seen in a short video from Arte by Eberhard
Rühle. In the video Carmen Ciobanu leaves her home every morning after 4 AM to travel to
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Bucharest where she works as a textile worker. Her working conditions are abusive and her
wages are low, but she is poor and has no choice but to work (Rühle 2017, 00:00:10). The
situation is similar in Bulgaria. Euro News’s journalist Daniel Bellamy, notes that despite an
increase in minimum wage, Bulgarian workers still endure the lowest minimum wage in the
European Union (Bellamy 2019, 00:00:02). In his video he also portrays how workers such as
Elena Marvakova also must endure sweat shop-like conditions in their jobs as textile workers
(Bellamy 2019, 00:00:13). In the Ukraine the situation is just as bad, as can be seen in a video
released by The World Bank. In the video a village pensioner Nadiia Khomenko is briefly
interviewed and says “ I am poor. I don’t have enough money, even for a very simple life” (The
World Bank 2018, 00:01:05). Eastern Europe is still a region with a significant amount of
poverty and economic struggle, and while this is not the case for every country in the region ,
the issue is significant. Additionally, through my own experience, even in a country like Poland
that is considered to be relatively well off in Eastern Europe, a significant portion of people
live poorly, with many families being forced to live in old and cramped communist-era
apartment blocks, as they cannot afford more modern and larger housing.
Since the transition from communism there have been a lot of social changes
throughout Eastern Europe For one, institutions such as the supermarket have been introduced,
indicating modernization and westernization in the region. People all over the region have also
been experiencing a new sense of freedom that has encouraged phenomena such as Pride events
or simply the kind of care-free café lounging that has been enjoyed in Western Europe for
years. Although, even with these changes it is important to note that there are still many
countries struggling with poverty and economic stagnation, and that not all Eastern Europeans
are necessarily well off because of the transition. However even in considering those negative
impacts the positive social changes are substantial, as even countries such as Russia or the
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Ukraine, that are generally considered to be on the less fortunate side of the transition, have
experienced them.
Conclusion
The changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe since the transition, align with the
demographic theories that have already been discussed in this paper. For instance the issue of
low wage sweat shop labor in Romania and Bulgaria (Bellamy 2019; Rühle 2017) goes hand
in hand with the Economic Crisis theory, as in such conditions people work difficult jobs for
little money and may not be able to afford many children. While the introduction of Western
institutions such as the supermarket in Poland or the new sense of freedom felt in cities like
Moscow (BBC 2017) could indicate a change in values and an increase in individual
autonomy which in turn could indicate a Second Demographic Transition or maybe a desire
to be like Western Europe as claimed by Thornton and Philipov (2007). In synthesizing the
different theories and data in this paper together, there is strong evidence that Eastern
Europe’s social and economic changes have influenced the fall in fertility. However further
research would need to be conducted in order to confirm that.
Concludingly, there could be a multitude of reasons as to why fertility rates in Eastern
Europe have fell so drastically in recent years. However, through the data presented in this
paper it is clear that in the years since the fall of communism in Europe, Eastern Europe has
experienced a significant number of social and economic changes that have coincided with
the fall of fertility in the area. Ultimately, the manner in which these social and economic
changes coincide with the fertility fall and align with theories on demographic change, makes
it highly likely that these social and economic changes have influenced the fertility fall in
Eastern Europe.
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